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Constitutional Rights: Horizontal Effect and Anti-
discrimination Law in Hungary 
 
 
Abstract. This contribution aims to examine how the Hungarian Constitution applies in 
private relations through judicial activity and how the anti-discrimination legislation influences 
this tendency. The current codification procedure of the new civil code calls for a thorough 
theoretical background in order to answer how its provisions relate to the Constitution. After 
the general overview of the practice of courts and the Constitutional Court, the criticism of 
scholars developed on the issue will shed light on the weaknesses, but in spite of them, the 
overall success of the theory of indirect horizontal effect. The paper will also deal with the 
horizontal effect of a specific constitutional right, namely the right to equal treatment. I 
examine the fairly new legal instrument, the act on the prohibition of certain forms of 
discrimination, and demonstrate how this new practice influences the idea of horizontal effect 
in constitutional law and what implications it has on the new Civil Code afoot. I argue that the 
act at first sight exists independently from the requirement of horizontal application of 
fundamental rights, but, in fact, it implicates the necessity to reconsider in its light how the 
Constitution applies in private relations.  
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The problem of horizontal effect of constitutional norms1 arises in many modern 
democracies.2 The legislative, the judiciary and constitutional courts seek answers 
concerning the nature of the modern protection of fundamental rights: what 
does the constitution command in the judicial assessment of private relations? 
How are constitutional rules binding if they are binding at all in certain private 
private relations? How constitutional rules apply exactly in private relations? 
 The doctrine of horizontal effect is primarily based on the recognition of the 
dangers posed to human rights by private entities. It is evident that states can 
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 1 This problem is referred to in the literature also as horizontal applicability, third-
party effect which is a literal translation of the German expression ‘Drittwirkung.’ All of 
those terms express the applicability of the constitution in private relations. 
 2 E.g, Sajó, A.–Uitz, R. (eds.): The Constitution in Private Relations: Expanding 
Constitutionalism. Utrecht, 2006.  
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always implement rules in order to protect defenseless individuals from the 
derogatory conduct of other private entities, as far as this does not contradict 
the constitution: private law provisions bring good examples for this and the 
fairly new anti-discrimination legislation also belongs to this category. As the 
state has this regulatory power, in most of the cases it is not necessary to 
invoke one’s fundamental rights granted by the Constitution in legal debates, 
but it is enough to call a statutory provision when seeking legal protection. The 
horizontal effect of constitutional rights is thus a “residual category”, which 
means that the horizontal application of constitutional rights occurs only if 
ordinary legislation fails to protect fundamental rights.3 Therefore, the relation 
of the anti-discrimination legislation and the traditional concept of third party 
effect is of high interest. The aim of this essay is–regarding the contribution to 
the debate on how far the constitution applies in private relations–to discover 
this nexus, and draw the attention to the different context that the new anti-
discrimination legislation created for the assessment of the implications of 
horizontal effect. This analysis will lead to the consideration of the controversies 
emerging in the codification process of the new Civil Code. 
 
 
1. The constitution in private relations  
 
The debate in Hungary on the issue of horizontal applicability of the consti-
tution is fairly heated, with special regard at the present codification process of 
the new Civil Code.4 The fairely new act on equal treatment and the promotion 
of equal opportunities5 adds some interesting additional information to the 
discussion.  
 Some authors argue in Hungary that direct horizontal applicability is 
desirable to develop6 to gain the full protection of constitutional rights as the 
Constitution itself suggests, some others contest in favor of the autonomy of 
  
 3 Tushnet, M.: The relationship between judicial review of legislation and the inter-
pretation of non-constitutional law, with reference to third party effect. In:  Sajó–Uitz (eds.):  
op. cit. 169.  
 4 Vékás, L.: Az új Polgári Törvénykönyv Elméleti Előkérdései [The theoretical preliminary 
problems of the new civil code]. Budapest, 2001. 
 5 Act CXXV of 2003 On Equal Treatment and the Promotion of Equal Opportunities, 
MK 2003/157. XII. 28. 
 6 Halmai, G.: Az Alkotmány mint norma a bírói jogalkalmazásban [Constitution as 
legal norm in jurisprudence]. Fundamentum 2 (1998) 77; Kovács, K.: Emberi jogaink 
magánjogi viszonyokban [Expanding the prohibition of discrimination in the European 
Convention of Human Rights]. Fundamentum 2 (1998) 85. 
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the civil law, and the impossibility of any kind of third-party effect of the 
Constitution.7 The advocates of the indirect horizontal effect state that the 
German model, Drittwirkung, would possibly suit the Hungarian system.8 
Legal practitioners often find arbitrary solutions in individual cases due to the 
lack of adequate guidelines.9 
 As to the origins of the problem we must note the following. The first 
written constitution in the United States was undoubtedly drafted with the 
aim to govern the relationship of the state and its citizens. The Bill of Rights 
incorporates limitations on the competencies of the Congress concerning 
some fundamental rights of citizens, but does not contain any requirement 
concerning private relations.10 In the United States, even these days, only the 
Thirteenth Amendment which prohibits slavery has direct horizontal effect,11 
while in other cases, the “state action doctrine”12 applies. However, in spite 
of the clear lack of mandate to apply the Constitution in private relations, U.S. 
courts tend to find state action in more and more dubious situations.13 The 
German social state answers the question of horizontal applicability differently. 
In the famous LüTh decision,14 the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(GFCC) declared that besides individual and collective rights, the post-war 
1949 German Constitution incorporates an objective order of values as well. 
These objective values are present in the entire legal system, thus courts are 
constitutionally obliged to interpret all norms that apply to private relations 
in the light of the Constitution.15 These two examples provide us with two 
entirely different solutions to our question, namely the role of constitutional 
norms in private relations.  
  
 7 Vincze, A.: Az alkotmány rendelkezéseinek érvényre juttatása a polgári jogviszo-
nyokban [Enforcing constitutional rules in private relations]. Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció, 6 
(2004) 3. 
 8 Vékás: Az új Polgári Törvénykönyv… op. cit. and Sonnevend, P.: Az alapjogi 
bíráskodás és korlátai [Basic rights adjudication and its limits]. Fundamentum, 2 (1998) 79. 
 9 Halmai, G.–Tóth, G. (eds.): Emberi Jogok [Human Rights]. Budapest, 2003. 224. 
 10 Ibid.  
 11 Tribe, L. H. (ed.): American Constitutional Law. St. Paul, Minn. 1988.  
 12 E.g. Stone, G. R.–Seidman, L. M.–Sunstein, C. R. et al.: Constitutional Law. Boston, 
1993. State action doctrine means that the Constitution directly applies if the court finds 
that the violation is imputable to the action of a state organ, or it occurred while a private 
actor fulfilled a state obligation.  
 13 E.g. Tribe, L. H.: Constitutional Choices. Cambridge, Mass. 1985. 
 14 Bundesverfassungsgesetz, 198 (1958). 
 15 Kommers, D. P.: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Durham, North Carolina, 1989. 
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 Similarly, we could mention as further examples Ireland16 and Poland,17 
where constitutional norms have direct horizontal effect, or Slovakia, where 
neither ordinary courts nor the constitutional court or the legislature accept that 
constitutional rights have any effect on private relations.18 As to the European 
Union: the „ECJ has developed a limited doctrine of horizontal direct effect for 
some legal provisions of the Treaties. The principles of non-discrimination 
on grounds of sex and nationality and the fundamental freedoms–as far as 
powerful social associations confronting the individual are concerned–have a 
horizontal direct effect in this jurisdiction.”19 
 
1.1. The perception of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and ordinary courts 
 
Examining Hungary, an example of the young democracies of Central 
Eastern Europe, we cannot find final answers for the question of horizontal 
applicability. The Constitutional Court has never been clear on the general 
scope of the protection of fundamental rights. However, it implemented the 
doctrine of the objective institutional protection of fundamental rights.20 In 
the 64/1991. AB decision, which dealt with the constitutionality of abortion, 
the Constitutional Court declared the following: “The state’s duty to respect 
and to protect subjective fundamental rights is not exhausted by the duty not to 
encroach on them, but incorporates the obligation to ensure the condition for 
their realization.”21  
 The Constitutional Court accepts that there is a burden on the state to act as 
a protective entity of human rights, in some cases in horizontal as well as in 
vertical relations; however it is not clear to what extent and in what way the 
  
 16 Casey, J. P.: Constitutional Law In Ireland. 2. ed. Dublin, 1992. 
 17 Kühn, Z.: Making Constitutionalism Horizontal: Three Different Central European 
Strategies. In: Sajó–Uitz (eds.): op. cit. 231–235. 
 18 Ibid. 229–231. 
 19 Case 43/75, Defrenne II v. Sabena, 1989 E.C.R. 455, para. 40; Case 36/74, Walrave 
v. Ass’n Union Cycliste Internale, 1974 E.C.R. 1405, paras. 16,19; Case 415/93 Union 
Royal Belge des Societes de Football Ass’n v. Bosman, 1993 E.C.R. I-4921, para. 82; Case 
281/98, Agonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, 2000 E.C.R. I-4139, paras. 30–36. 
 20 Halmai, G.: The third party effect in Hungarian adjudication. In: Sajó–Uitz (eds.): 
op. cit. 104.  
 21 64/1991. (XII. 17.) AB határozat, Az Alkotmánybíróság Határozatai, 1991. 297, 302 
translated by Halmai: ibid. 104. 
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state should protect the individuals against each other. Taking a clear stance on 
these issues has always been postponed so far.22 
 The Constitution contains several articles about the rights of the judiciary 
in Article 50 and 57.23 However, article 70/K., in the chapter of fundamental 
rights and obligations, is in the center of the debates concerning the issue of 
horizontal effect. It states the following: “claims arising from infringement on 
fundamental rights, and objections to the decisions of public authorities 
regarding the fulfillment of duties may be brought before a court of law”.  
 Art. 70/K. is a rule that creates competence for the courts in case of the 
infringement of fundamental rights. However, the debate concerns the question 
if it declares that courts have to defend fundamental rights also in case of a 
conflict between private individuals where no other legal instrument applies. 
This controversy is rooted in the wording of this article, though it is quite clear 
that the intent of the framers was not as broad as to imply that the courts 
should apply constitutional provisions directly or indirectly.  
 The Constitutional Court declared in its decisions, defining the content of 
this article that this rule is not even as broad as to open the courts door in front 
of all claims concerning rights violation of state actors.24 Hence, it is striking 
that the Constitutional Court has also never thought about the possibility of 
getting the judiciary to protect horizontal violations by referring to this article 
  
 22 Holló, A.–Balogh, Zs. (eds.): Az értelmezett alkotmány [The constitution interpreted]. 
Budapest, 2005. XII. chapter. 
 23 Art. 57 (1) In the Republic of Hungary everyone is equal before the law and has the 
right to have the accusations brought against him, as well as his rights and duties in legal 
proceedings, judged in a just, public trial by an independent and impartial court established 
by law.  
 (5) In the Republic of Hungary everyone may seek legal remedy, in accordance with 
the provisions of the law, to judicial, administrative or other official decisions, which 
infringe on his rights or justified interests. A law passed by a majority of two-thirds of the 
votes of the Members of Parliament present may impose restrictions on the right to legal 
remedy in the interest of, and in proportion with, adjudication of legal disputes within a 
reasonable period of time. 
 50. § (1) The courts of the Republic of Hungary should protect and uphold constitu-
tional order, as well as the rights and lawful interests of natural person, legal persons and 
unincorporated organizations, and should determine the punishment for those who commit 
criminal offenses.  
 (2) The courts should review the legality of the decisions of public administration.  
 (3) Judges are independent and answer only to the law. Judges may not be members of 
political parties and may not engage in political activities.  
 24 46/1994. (X. 21.) AB határozat. Az Alkotmánybíróság Határozatai, 1994. 260, 267–
268; 998/B/1994. AB határozat. Az Alkotmánybíróság Határozatai, 2005. 752, 753. 
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where no other legal instrument applied. In sum, the meaning of this article is 
definitely diffuse, but could undoubtedly serve as a possible basis if the Consti-
tutional Court wishes to hold that the judiciary is obliged to protect constitu-
tional rights in private relations even if there is not any other applicable law. 
 However, in this case the Constitutional Court would face, as the German 
type real constitutional complaint does not exist in Hungary,25 the problem that 
it cannot supervise and thus standardize constitutional interpretation. Presently, 
the Constitutional Court does not have the right to override and repair statutory 
or, in some courageous cases, constitutional interpretation of ordinary courts, 
while the ordinary courts does not seem to be competent to decide purely on 
grounds of constitutional provisions. They usually reject claims based only on 
the infringement of a constitutional right,26 usually require a reference to a 
statute or a sub-statutory legal instrument to handle the case in the merits. 
Once, for example the state prosecutor argued that courts should take into 
consideration all legal arguments; hence the Constitution should also apply in 
private relations. The Supreme Court in its judgment replied that it was the 
exclusive competence of the Constitutional Court to interpret the Constitution 
and the task of the ordinary courts are to use all valid, thus presumably con-
stitutional legal instruments.27 
 Several times ordinary judges interpret the Constitution together with the 
applicable legal rule,28 though usually do not name constitutional provisions. 
As the Civil Code, for example, in Art. 76 contains provisions on inherent 
personality rights,29 the violation of these rights violates the Constitution as 
  
 25 With the adjective “real” we distinguish here the German and the Hungarian type 
constitutional complaint, because in Hungary the applicants can solely turn to the 
Constitutional Court asking for the annulment of the legal instrument applied in their very 
case, and demand the Constitutional Court to prohibit the application of that unconstitutional 
law in the case retroactively, but can not ask for the supervision of the constitutionality of 
the legal procedure, and the interpretation of the ordinary court. Act 1989. XXXII. Art. 48.  
 26 Halmai: The third party effect... op. cit. 106. 
 27 BH 1994. I.  
 28 E.g. Gazette of the Supreme Court 1992/14. BH1997. 489; BH 1998. 132; PKKB 
29.P.87.533/1996/4. find this in Halmai: The third party effect… op. cit. 109.  
 29 See Chapter VII of the Civil Code (Act. IV of 1959), the ban on discrimination 
between individuals according to sex, race, nationality and religion, and prohibition of 
infringements of personal honor and human dignity. 
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well. Judges deciding these cases, however, almost never refer to the Consti-
tution, but merely to the Civil Code.30 
 There are only few exceptions which show that the practice of the courts is 
not carved in stone. In an abortion case in 1998, the judge referred to the right 
to life provision of the Constitution and based its decision on the fetus’s right 
to life, though no Hungarian statute declared this standpoint, and this view is 
inconsistent with the interpretation of the Constitutional Court.31 In another 
case the issue was gender discrimination in an employment matter. Here the 
court succesfully referred directly to the constitutional provisions without 
naming any civil law rule.32  
 These cases shed light on the perils of direct application of constitutional 
rules, show that there is not any guarantee for an interpretation consistent with 
the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. In the lack of the German type 
real constitutional complaint when the parties can question the constitutionality 
of the statutory interpretation of ordinary courts, and the Constitutional Court 
can revise the decisions of ordinary courts, it is probably not feasible to provide 
reliable, calculable decisions to the parties seeking the protection of the law. 
 Although judges usually do not adjudicate pure constitutional matters, in 
the flow of interpretation they are obliged to interpret the provisions of the 
legal instruments in conformity with the Constitution. Although this duty is not 
explicitly stated in any legal instrument, it follows from the competencies of 
the courts and the legal status of the Constitution as the basic law of Hungary, 
declared in the last provision of it.  
 I argue that the means in the Hungarian legal system and legal thinking are 
sufficient to talk about the indirect horizontal effect of constitutional rights. 
Although this interpretation does not have a binding force, a slight effort is 
enough to affirm this theory, because every step of the Constitutional Court 
and ordinary courts points towards this direction. Ordinary courts if open-
minded are capable to carry out statutory interpretation in accordance with 
constitutional requirements.  
  
 30 See e.g. Góman case, a Roma who was not served in a restaurant, Fundamentum 2 
(1998) 133; Roma schoolchildren segregated graduation ceremony case, Fundamentum  3 
(1999) 124.  
 31 For the full text of the judgement see Fundamentum, 2 (1998) 73. Comments on the 
decision e.g. Halmai: Az Alkotmány mint norma… op. cit. 77. Hanák, A.: Egy különös 
abortusz után [After a strange abortion]. Fundamentum, 2 (1998) 82.  
 32 Gender discrimination regarding the admission criterias to a job, Fundamentum, 4 
(2000) 72. 
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 Art. 38 of the 1989. XXXII. Act on the Constitutional Court ensures that 
judges can initiate the constitutional review of legal instruments to be applied 
in the pocedure with the suspension of the case. Under the present rules, 
judges cannot deny the application of allegedly non-constitutional provisions, 
but are obliged to refer the case to the Constitutional Court in case of alleged 
unconstitutionality so that it decides on the constitutionality of the legal 
instrument. The parties can also initiate this step in the procedure. This would 
be an excellent vehicle to guarantee not only the constitutionality of the legal 
instruments,33 but the constitutional interpretation of the law as well. Ordinary 
judges must have the right to ask for a constitutional interpretation of the law, 
if any doubt emerges. 
 Furthermore, the “law in action doctrine” existing in the jurisprudence of 
the Constitutional Court, namely that the Constitutional Court can examine and 
invalidate law if there is a tendency of unconstitutional interpretation, approves 
and helps to secure the guarantees of indirect horizontal effect. The roots of 
this idea imply the acknowledgment of indirect effect of the Constitution, 
namely the requirement that ordinary courts interpret legal norms in conformity 
with the Constitution. This doctrine was quite neglected for a lond time and is 
rarely used in present jurisdiction as well, however forms the bases of some 
recent decisions, where the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional and 
invalidated the guiding decisions of the Supreme Court, obligatory to lower 
courts.34 This jurisprudence also helps to secure the constitutional interpre-
tation of ordinary courts, because the Constitutional Court is able to act if the 
judiciary is on the wrong track.  
 In sum, on the surface both the standpoints of ordinary courts and the 
Constitutional Court are unclear on the issue of horizontal application. How-
ever, this overview suggests that the explicit introduction of indirect horizontality 
would not meet much resistance while it is already comfortable for the actors 
of the Hungarian courts. 
 
1.2. Scholars’ arguments  
 
Having all this in mind, we examine the three main positions taken by 
Hungarian scholars regarding the horizontal application of constitutional rules 
de lege ferenda: one argues in favor of the exclusively vertical nature of the 
  
 33 See examples to these motions in Uitz, R: Egyéni jogsérelmek és az Alkotmánybíró-
ság [Violation of individual rights and the Constitutional Court]. Fundamentum 3 (1999) 39.  
 34 42/2005. (XI. 14.) ABH 2005. 504. 
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Constitution, and the other two represents direct and indirect horizontal 
application of it.  
 János Sári denies the horizontal applicability of the Constitution. He argues 
that Article 70/K. of the Constitution refers only to the infringement of funda-
mental rights by governmental bodies, but definitely does not include the right 
to issue a claim when the fundamental rights of a person are infringed by 
another private person. Hence the only possible textual ground on which 
horizontal applicability could be introduced into the Hungarian legal system 
is not a sound one.35 Albert Takács’s view is slightly less radical, although it 
leads us in the same direction. He states that it is not possible that ordinary 
courts base their decisions on the Constitution because practically the statutes 
must be able to govern private relationships. He claims that under Art. 32/A. of 
the Constitution, the Constitutional Court is the sole body that may decide on 
questions of constitutionality. He argues that 70/K. of the Constitution would be 
applicable only if there were no statutory provisions on fundamental rights, but 
in this case referring merely to constitutional provisions theoretically would 
also mean that statutes must be regarded as invalid when they conflict with the 
Constitution which is not acceptable under the current Constitution.36  
 Contrary to this, Gábor Gadó and Gábor Halmai suggest introducing direct 
horizontal effect in the Hungarian legal system, where judges may freely 
interpret the Constitution and disregard unconstitutional rules,37 what is more, 
judges should be empowered to base their judgments merely on constitutional 
provisions. Halmai argues that only the holding of the Constitutional Court’s 
judgments should be binding on everybody, while the reasoning of the 
decisions, containing the interpretation of the Constitution, should not. The 
interpretation of the Constitution should belong to the competence of ordinary 
courts as much as to the Constitutional Court.38 He also suggests the imple-
mentation of the the German type “real constitutional complaint” as a new 
competence for the Constitutional Court. This solution would bring a similar 
solution as the one of the German Constitutional Court, where the applicants 
  
 35 Sári J.: Alapjogok. Alkotmánytan II. [Fundamental Rights. Constitutional law II], 
Budapest, 2000. 278. 
 36 Takács, A.: Kinek feladata az alkotmány közvetlen alkalmazása? Fórum, [Whose 
task is the direct application of the constitution? Forum] Fundamentum, 2 (1998) 50–56. 
 37 On the same opinion see Hanák A.: Egy különös abortusz. op. cit., Halmai: Az 
alkotmány mint norma... op. cit. 77–81. 
 38 Ibid.  
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may turn to the Constitutional Court if the law was presumed to be constitu-
tional, but applied in an unconstitutional manner.39  
 Halmai also argues that Art. 77 § (2) of the Constitution implies that judges 
have to apply the Constitution as much as other rules of the legal system,40 while 
others suggest that Art. 77 (2) requires a different interpretation principally 
because of its historical background.41 Regarding the Supreme Court decision 
which stated that solely the Constitutional Court can interpret the Constitu-
tion,42 a counterargument may be that Art. 32/A. of the Constitution43 does not 
require the exclusivity of the interpretative power, but purely wishes to fix the 
exclusive competence on the annulment of unconstitutional legal instruments.44 
 Gábor Attila Tóth suggests that ordinary judges have the right to interpret 
the Constitution and apply it directly in the decision-making process, although 
this solution would require the implementation of the German type real con-
stitutional complaint.45 Krisztina Kovács also argues in favor of the direct 
horizontal effect of the Constitution. She states–sharing the view of Gábor 
Kardos–that the fundamental feature of rights requires their direct applicability 
in private relations as long as it does not interfere with the constitutionally 
protected sphere of private autonomy. This is how one may gain the full 
protection of fundamental rights.46 
 Zoltán Lomnici is also in a fight for the rights of ordinary courts to interpret 
and take constitutional provisions into consideration while carrying out judg-
ments. He respects the separation of powers between ordinary courts and the 
Constitutional Court, however finds necessary in certain cases to base ordinary 
court decisions solely on constitutional provisions. He bases his argument on 
Art. 70/K. of the Constitution, which he interprets as establishing the powers 
  
 39 Halmai G.: The third party effect in Hungarian adjudication. op. cit. 112. 
 40 Halmai G.:  Az Alkotmány mint norma... op. cit. 77–81.  
 41 Sonnevend: Az alapjogi bíráskodás. op. cit. 79–84. 
 42 See BH 1994. I. 
 43 Constitution 32/A. (1) The Constitutional Court should review the constitutionality 
of laws and attend to the duties assigned to its jurisdiction by law. 
 44 Halmai: Az Alkotmány mint norma... op. cit. 80. 
 45 Tóth, C. A.: Az emberi jogok bírói védelme [The judicial protection of human 
rights]. Társadalmi Szemle, 50 (1995) 39–44.  
 46 Kovács, K.: Emberi jogaink – magánjogi jogviszonyokban [Human rights–in private 
law relations. Fundamentum, 2 (1998) 85–90. and Kardos, G.: Az új Alkotmány emberi 
jogi fejezete [The chapter on human rights in the new Constitution]. In: Ádám A. (ed.): 
Alapjogok és alkotmányozás. Az emberi jogok szabályozása az új Alkotmányban [Funda-
mental rights and making constitution: the regulation of human rights in the new 
Consitution]. Budapest, 1996. 17. 
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of ordinary courts to decide in all cases where there is violation of fundamental 
rights.47 
 Pál Sonnevend convincingly argues in favor of indirect horizontal effect. He 
states that judges are not authorised to decide about the conflict of constitutional 
rights because Art. 8 (2) of the Constitution declares that in the Republic of 
Hungary regulations pertaining to fundamental rights and duties are determined 
by law. He takes the oneness of fundamental rights a starting point and claims 
that augmenting the right on one side will definitely lead to the diminishing of 
rights on the other side of the relation. When a judge has to decide in conflicts 
of fundamental rights, he will definitely diminish one right in favor of securing 
the other one. This is, in his view, not acceptable under Art. 8 (2) of the 
Constitution.48 
 Sonnevend also suggests that a German type Drittwirkung solution should 
be applicable in Hungary.49 He argues that Art. 70/K. of the Constitution may 
not be applied against non-state actors, meanwhile Art. 77 § (2) demands that 
the courts interpret the applicable rules in the light of the Constitution. 
Sonnevend also argues that it may follow from the practice of the Constitu-
tional Court that a German type “real constitutional complaint” be implemented 
in Hungary, while the 23/1998. (VI. 29.) AB decision holds that there must be 
due reparation if the Constitutional Court has declared an infringement of a 
constitutional right.50  
 In sum, we may note that it is hard to find the common denominator in the 
scholars’ wiews. This might be reasoned with the different interpretations of 
constitutional provisions. We observed that horizontal application of constitu-
tional rights could be approached from several points of view and involves a 
broad range of aspects of modern constitutionality. There is an underlying 
question about the extent of fundamental rights and the separation of powers, 
namely who will and should decide on the concrete extent of rights protection. 
Many authors have fears from the loss or at least the diminishing of private 
autonomy; however it is very clear that this so called private autonomy is far 
from being absolute in present legal theory and practice as well. The duty to 
decide how the constitution applies in private relations should not be solely the 
task of judges, but burdens the legislative as well, if not primarily.  
  
 47 Lomnici, Z.: Kinek a feladata az alkotmány közvetlen alkalmazása? [Whose task is 
the direct application of the Constitution?] Fundamentum, 2 (1998) 47. 
 48 Sonnevend: Az alapjogi bíráskodás. op. cit. 80. 
 49 Ibid. at 79–84. 
 50 Ibid. at 83. 
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 The essence of direct effect of fundamental rights is that the judiciary can 
specify rules in the light of the contsitution where the legislation did not intend 
to regulate. The principal question is thus if the judiciary should have this 
competence or not. This problem occurs where the legislative has decided to 
refrain from regulating a certain private relations as a policy consideration, and 
the court applying this doctrine in fact overrides the decision of the legislative.51 
 The relations in modern societies indeed necessitate expanding the scope of 
the constitution, because private entities with enormous powers may represent a 
danger to fundamental rights.52 Nonetheless, I argue that direct horizontal 
applicablilty leads to arbitrariness, judicial legislation ahd what is even more 
important, suggests that there is not any segment of life free from legal intrusion.  
 It is problematic to demonstrate how fundamental rights in general have 
indirect horizontal effect, this question should not be forcibly answered in the 
same manner in case of different constitutional rights. This approach helps to 




2. Constitutional  and  statutory  anti-discrimination 
 
We have learnt so far the most important decisions and scholarly developed 
ideas which influence the horizontal application of the Constitution. After 
having recognized that the question of third party effect emerges only in 
exceptional situations when ordinary laws fail to protect fundamental rights, a 
further step to make is to ask how ordinary laws protect constitutional rights. 
In Europe the anti-discrimination legislation is the best example to trace this 
phenomenon.54 We have thus two tasks for the rest of this paper. Firstly we 
examine how the fairly new act on equal treatment interacts with the concept 
of horizontal applicability. Secondly we try to demonstrate what implications 
this new tendency has on the new civil code afoot. 
  
 51 Tushnet M.: The relationship between judicial review of legislation and the inter-
pretation of non-constitutional law… op. cit.  170–171. 
 52 Cf. Walt, J. van der: Blixen’s Difference: Horizontal Application of Fundamental 
Rights and the Resistance of Neocolonialism. Law, Social Justice and Global Development 
Journal, 2003 (1)  http:// elj.warwick.ac.uk/global/03-1/vanderwalt.html.  
 53 Explanatory preamble to the Bill of fundamental rights which was eventually to 
become part of the Dutch Constitution. Clapham, A.: Human Rights in the Private Sphere. 
Oxford, 1993. 178. 
 54 Sajó–Uitz (eds.): op. cit. 5. 
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 I wish to demonstrate that anti-discrimination legislation, in fact, directs 
towards the direct effect of certain provisions of the constitution in certain 
well-defined matters. It introduces the direct effect in an indirect manner. The 
area, where the constitution applies with the help of anti-discrimination laws 
extends beyond the traditional private law protection of parties of generally 
weaker bargaining position, and aims to protect equal human dignity in these 
precisely defined private situations. I focus my research on provisions 
prohibiting discrimination on different grounds concerning the access to and 
supply of goods and services, which are available to the public, including 
housing. These new standards are in the crossfire of debates because they 
prohibit discrimination also in situations where previously the discrimination 
as such was not explicitly prohibited and the economic analysis of law 
questions the efficiency of such a rule.55  
 However, I argue that the constitutional protection of equal human dignity 
indeed requires that the law intrudes into certain private spheres, which were 
previously free. This, however, cannot interfere unconstitutionally with the 
freedom to contract, which is a matter of private autonomy and thus rooted in 
the protection of equal human dignity as well.  Having all this in mind, let us 
see how the horizontal effect of the constitutional right to non-discrimination 
in private relations develops through legislative vehicles.56 
  
 55 Cf. Menyhárd, A.: Diszkrimináció-tilalom és polgári jog [Prohibitation of discrimi-
nation and civil law]. Polgári jogi kodifikáció, 8 (2006) 8, see generally Posner, R. A.: 
Economic Analysis of Law. 4. edition, Boston, 1992. 
 56 I do not differentiate in this paper between non-discrimination and equal treatment, 
however I am aware of the fact that this difference in language is in the center of certain 
debates. Equal treatment can be interpreted in two ways: one understands non-
discrimination when it comes to equal treatment, thus uses these two as synonyms, and the 
other means the positive duty to provide equal treatment for others. I argue that nothing in 
the constitutions leads into the direction to require the application of the second 
interpretation in relation to private matters, because it would pose a positive duty on 
citizens to solidaritate, and do help defenseless people in order to provide them equal 
treatment. I argue that the aim of equal treatment, when it has an additional meaning to 
non-discrimination can only be understood as the constitutional task and duty of the state. 
However, to elaborate on this issue would be a subject matter of another thesis, hence now, 
we need to take this standpoint as granted for the purpose of this paper, and regarded as 
underlined by the language of the Directive implementing the equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. The legislative intent is the following: 
 “For the purposes of this Directive, the principle of equal treatment shall mean that 
there shall be no direct or indirect discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin.” 
(Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal 
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2.1. The Constitution and the Act on equal treatment and the promotion of  
  equal opportunities57 
 
Art. 70/A. of the Hungarian Constitution states that  
 
(1) The Republic of Hungary should respect the human rights and civil 
rights of all persons in the country without discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, gender, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origins, financial situation, birth or on any other grounds whats-
oever. (2) The law should provide for strict punishment of discrimination on 
the basis of Paragraph (1) (3) The Republic of Hungary should endeavor to 
implement equal rights for everyone through measures that create fair 
opportunities for all.58 
 
 Reading these articles the grammatical interpretation suggests that these 
provisions do not regulate the entire legal order, but purely circumscribe the 
tasks of the state. However, the Constitutional Court elaborated on equal dignity 
of persons concerning this provision, first in the 9/1990. (IV. 25.) AB decision 
(ABH 1990, 46). This standpoint led to the extension of the scope of the 
Constitution towards private relations in the 61/1992. (XI. 20.)59 AB decision 
(ABH 1992, 280).60  
 The constitutional provision prohibiting discrimination formulates boundaries 
for the legislation, and thus certainly influences up to a certain level private 
relations as well.61 However, the Court refused to determine what precise 
obligation the legislative has, where must be the discrimination outlawed in 
order to fulfill the requirements of the Constitution.62 
                                                      
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, Official Journal of the 
European Communities, L 180/24. 19. 7. 2000. Art, 2, 1.) 
 57 Act. CXXV of 2003 on equal treatment MK 2003/157. XII. 28. Find the english text 
of the law at http://www.egyenlobanasmod.hu/index.php?g=tej.htm, when it is not 
otherwise indicated. 
 58 1949. XX. Act on the Constitution, paragraph 70/A. 
 59 See further Sólyom L.: Az alkotmánybíráskodás kezdetei Magyarországon [Early 
years of constitutional adjudication in Hungary]. Budapest, 2001. 460, 463. 
 60 Menyhárd, A.: Diszkriminációtilalom és polgári jog [Prohibition of discrimination 
and civil law]. In : Sajó, A. (ed.): Alkotmányosság a magánjogban [Constitutionality in 
civil law]. 2006. 132. 
 61 E.g. Győrffy, T.: Az alkotmánybíráskodás politikai karaktere [The Political Character 
of Constitutional Adjudication]. Budapest, 2001. 133. 
 62 45/2000 (XII. 8.) AB határozat (ABH 2000, 344.). 
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 Before the accession to the European Union, in 2003, the Hungarian state 
implemented the Act CXXV. of 2003 on equal treatment and the promotion of 
equal opportunities (the Act on equal treatment). The birth date of this act is 
not accidental; it was urged by EU obligations,63 which among others imposed 
the content of certain directives (2000/43/EC, 2004/113/EC directives).64 
Scholars state that it tries to touch upon “public private relations”65 and 
prohibit discrimination on this field. 
 
The preamble of the Act declares the aim of the legislation:  
 
The Parliament, acknowledging every person’s right to live as a person of 
equal dignity, intending to provide effective legal aid to those suffering from 
negative discrimination, declaring that the promotion of equal opportunities 
is principally the duty of the State, having regard to Articles 54 (1) and 
70/A of the Constitution, the international obligations of the Republic and 
the legal acts of the European Union, hereby enacts the following Act: 
 
 The Official explanation to the preamble states that according to the decade-
long practice of the Constitutional Court, the prohibition of discrimination 
established in Art. 70/A. (1) in connection with human dignity stated in Art. 54 
(1), establishes the duty of the state to protect and provide equal dignity for 
everybody in the legal system. In accordance with the interpretation of the 
Constitutional Court, the discrimination violates human dignity if it is arbitrary, 
does not have a rationally acceptable reason [35/1994 (VI. 24.) AB decision, 
ABH 1994, 197, 200]. The Constitutional Court declared the basic requirements 
concerning Art. 70/A. in its early decision, 61/1992 (XI. 20.): 
  
 63 Art. 65 of the law on equal treatment: “This Act contains regulation in harmony with 
the provisions concerning law approximation of the Europe Agreement establishing an 
association between the European Communities and their Member States on the one part 
and the Republic of Hungary on the other part, signed in Brussels on 16 December 1991 
and promulgated by in Act I of 1994, compatible with the following legal acts of the 
European Union”. 
 64 Bíró, A.: Pro és contra, az egyenlő bánásmódról és az esélyegyenlőség előmozdítá-
sáról szóló törvény margójára [Pro and contra, to the margo of the law on equal treatment 
and promotion of equality of chances]. In: Parlamenti ösztöndíjasok [Parliament scholar-
ship]. Budapest, 2004. at 316, 320. 
 65 The expression is used first by the Final Concept to the Act, March, 2003. Cf. Farkas 
L.–Kádár A.-K.–Kárpáti J.: Néhány megjegyzés az egyenlő bánásmódról szól törvény kon-
cepciójához [Some remarks to the conception of the act on equal treatment]. Fundamentum, 7 
(2003) 121. 
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…the state as the public authority is obliged to provide equal treatment for 
all present on the territory of the state. In connection with this in cannot 
discriminate on grounds of ethnicity, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, ethnic or social origin, financial, natal or other situation. 
The prohibition contained in Art. 70/A. of the constitution does not only 
extend to human or basic citizen’s rights, but this prohibition–when the 
discrimination violates the right to equal human dignity–extends to the 
whole legal system. (ABH 1992, 280, 281).  
 
 The Official explanation also draws the attention to the requirement 
following from Art. 8 (1) of the Constitution.66 It declares that it is the principal 
aim of the state to respect and protect fundamental rights. The Official explanation 
refers then again to the practice of the Constitutional Court elaborating on the 
detailed content of this provision providing that the state has the duty under 
Art. 8 of the Constitution to provide sufficient conditions in order to protect 
these fundamental rights as the rights to equality and human dignity as well 
[64/1991 (XII. 17.) AB decision, ABH 1991, 258, 262]. 
 Let us compare this argument to the one of the decision 45/2000 (XII. 8.) 
(ABH 2000, 344, 351). The Constitutional Court claimed here that the state does 
not have the duty to provide a uniform law on non-discrimination, there is no 
omission regarding the required level of rights protection on this field, 
although the state has not exhausted all possibilites in order to provide legislative 
protection.67 It is easy to recognise the ambiguity of this statement. If the state 
  
 66 Reasoning to the Act on equal treatment, Preamble point 2. Translated by the author 
of this paper. 
 67 See the critics of this decision in Halmai G.: Hátrányos passzivizmus [Negative 
passivism]. Fundamentum, 4 (2000), and Halmai G.: Szükség van-e antidiszkriminációs 
törvényre Magyarországon? [Is an anti-discrimination law necessary in Hungary?] In: 
Petrétei J. (ed.): Emlékkönyv Bihari Ottó egyetemi tanár születésének 80. évfordulójára  
[Festschrift]. Pécs, 2001 and Kiss, B.: Az egyenlő bánásmód követelménye az Alkotmány-
bíróság gyakorlatában [The Duty of Equal Treatment in the Practice of The Constitutional 
Court]. Acta Universitas Szegediensis. Acta Juridica Et Politica. 67/12 (2005) 15–16. 
Gábor Halmai and Balázs Toth suggest that the legislation is indeed in omission, when not 
enacting rules to protect individuals against every kind of discrimination. They base their 
arguments on Art. 70/A. (2) of the Constitution, which identifies as a state duty to punish 
all violation of discrimination enacted in paragraph (1) of the same article. Cf, Halmai, G.: 
Előszó [Foreword]. In: Halmai G. (ed.): A hátrányos megkülönböztetés tilalmától a pozitív 
diszkriminációig – A jog lehetőségei és korlátai [From the Prohibition of Negative Treat-
ment to Positive Discrimination–Potentials and Limits of Law]. Budapest, 1998. 4; Tóth, B.: 
Impossibilum nulla obligatio est, avagy szülessen-e antidiszkriminációs törvény Magyar-
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can do even more than it presently provides in order to protect fundamental 
rights, namely to protect human dignity violation through discrimination, why 
does not it commit an unconstitutional omission if it fails to do so? This is a 
little bit controversial, but definitely demands the conclusion that the Constitu-
tional Court holds, it is the duty of the state to provide protection, although the 
possible level of the exact constitutional protection has not been established. 
As a conclusion, the legislative is not constitutionally obliged under the present 
concept of the Constitutional Court to implement further measures on equal 
treatment or non-discrimination.  
 In the light of this, Art. 5 and 6 of the Act on equal treatment brings 
dogmatic novelty compared to any previous private law rules, because indeed 
requires the application of constitutional standards in private law matters. 
Moreover, the act goes much further than the required level by the EU in the 
above mentioned directives. We cannot find explicit orders in the directives to 
implement such a wide concept as the Hungarian one, intruding into the private 
sphere through assigning a barrier on all private actors concerning their choice 
to decide who they contract with, when they make a proposal to persons not 
previously selected to enter into contract, or invite such persons for tender or 
provide services or sell goods at their premises open to customers (Art. 5–6). 
Furthermore, the prohibition applies to all enlisted grounds (Art. 8), the 
legislative rejected the idea of the hierarchy of discrimination as well.  
 According to the original version of the Act, only Art 22 provided the 
possibility for exception. It is worth to see how constitutional adjudication 
sneaks into the words of the law. 
 
The principle of equal treatment is not violated if 
a) the discrimination is proportional, justified by the characteristic or 
nature of the work and is based on all relevant and legitimate terms and 
conditions, or 
b) the discrimination arises directly from a religious or other ideological 
conviction or national or ethnic origin fundamentally determining the 
nature of the organisation, and it is proportional and justified by the 
nature of the employment activity or the conditions of its pursuit. 
 
 It is obvious for the first sight that the legislative (indirectly) required the 
judiciary to apply constitutional standards directly, by giving the same tests as 
                                                      
országon [Impossibilium nulla obligatio est, or do we want an antidiscrimination law in 
Hungary]. In: Halmai: ibid. 94. 
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the Constitutional Court has developed as a tool for the assessment of the legal 
debates. 
 However, a mistake poisoned the concept, because, it is well known that 
the test of the Constitutional Court does not sound exactly like this. Hence the 
rules were modified in 2006. The modification contains that Art. 7 should be 
completed with the following: if this law does not indicate otherwise, the acts 
do not violate the requirement of equal treatment 
 a) if the fundamental right of a person is restricted in inevitable cases in 
order to provide the prevalence of an other fundamental right if the 
restriction is capable to reach the aim and proportionate with that. 
 b) When in cases beyond Art. 1, the act has an objective reason under 
rational assessment. 
 The reasoning to the modification of this paragraph explains that the rules 
follow the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, which has stated in 
several decisions that an act is not discriminative when it restrict a funda-
mental right necessarily and proportionately, and a non-fundamental right in a 
not arbitrary manner. (e.g. 30/1997 (IV. 29.) AB decision, ABH 1997, 130, 140.).  
 Finally the Act indeed requires from the judiciary and the Authority68 to 
assess individual cases in the light of the Constitution, applying the tests 
developed by the Constitutional Court. This phenomenon might be labeled as 
the “indirect direct” effect of the constitutional provision in a thouroughly 
circumscribed, but not quite narrow scope.  
 
  
 68 As to the practice of the Authority established by the act, but working only since 
February 2005,68 we must emphasize that the provision stated in Art. 5 a) means in factthat 
banks and insurance companies can make an offer, which is understood as a proposal to 
persons not previously selected to enter into contract. However it was not understood as 
such a contract, when a condominium did not enter into contract with a disabled, or a 
wholesale trade did not contract with a Roma. Demeter, J.: Az egyenlő bánásmód és az 
esélyegyenlőség előmozdítása [Equal treatment and the promotion of equal opportunities], 
Acta Humana 17 (2006) 53.  
 As to the second point b) of Art. 5, it regulates restaurants and pubs or discos, who 
intend to discriminate against Romas and others on grounds of skin colour. The 
interpretation problems from this regard has not yet emerged at the authority, and there 
were not yet many cases concerning the two other points of this statutory provision. Cf. 
Demeter: ibid. 
 In sum, we can already see that the most problematic point concerning the new law on 
equal treatment, which touches upon the problems raised in this paper relate to the 
provision Art. 5 point a), namely concerns the case when someone makes a proposal to 
persons not previously selected to enter into contract or invite such persons for tender. 
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2.2. The codification of the new Civil Code: questions to be answered 
 
After having had regard on the interrelated nature of the concept of horizontal 
applicability and the Act on equal treatment, I would like to draw the attention 
to the present codification process of the new civil code. The constitutionally 
required level of protection against discrimination in private matters, and in 
relation to this the necessity of the declaration of indirect horizontal effect is a 
matter of current debates. I try to demonstrate that the above draw conclusions 
might help here to add to the solution of the emerging problems. First of all 
have a look at the standpoints of the scholars and the leader of the codification 
procedure, Lajos Vékás. 
 Vékás argues that it is not possible to measure constitutional rights in civil 
law adjudication with the tests developed in constitutional law. Civil law 
litigation, even if it concerns fundamental rights in conflict, is not about the 
constitutional evaluation of legal instruments. Hence it is a crucial question to 
answer how civil law courts should reach the required protection of funda-
mental rights.69 
 Lábady emphasizes that the dogmatic of private law had great effect on the 
development of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence. It is a tendency that 
private law gains the more and more territory from other public branches of the 
law, namely tries to incorporate important public law rules into its codes, 
because it feels the more and more concern about the public sphere.70 This is 
why it becomes possible to use the same standards in private law as in consti-
tutional law. Lábady argues that the Constitution binds everybody this is why it 
has to be directly applicable in private litigations as well. The Constitution 
determines private relations, because otherwise they would not be always 
consistent with constitutional values. This means first of all that statutes and 
other legal instruments have to be conform to the Constitution, and if there is 
no civil law regulation on the matter, the Constitution directly has to protect 
the individuals against each other.71 There are many civil lawyers however, 
who feel that it is impossible to give direct or indirect horizontal effect to the 
Constitution, because it is completely strange to the logic of private law.72  
  
 69 Ibid. 160. 
 70 Lábady, T.: Alkotmányjogi hatások a készülő Ptk. szabályaira [Effects of constitutional 
law on the draft Civil Code]. Polgári jogi kodifikáció, 2 (2000). 
 71 Ibid. See also Lábady, T.: Alkotmányos alapjogok és személyiségi jogok [Basic 
rights and personality rights]. Jogi Beszélgetések [(Discussion in law]. Kaposvár, 2000. 
 72 Cf. Vincze: Az alkotmány rendelkezéseinek érvényre juttatása. op. cit. 
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 Lábady puts the essence of the debate the following way: if the constitutional 
provisions should apply indirectly to private relations through interpretations 
of civil law rules, it is the task of the codification and the codificators to tell 
how and to what extent.  
 However, if the Constitution applies directly, it is not problematic to exclude 
any special rules from the Civil Code.73 Vékás–rejecting Lábady’s views– draws 
the attention to the discretion of the judges in private matters. They intend to 
decide applying general clauses, and in this process they have the power to 
interpret legal rules, which will provide anyway the full protection of funda-
mental rights without any change in the legal system.74 
 At present, the Civil Code in paragraph 76. contains the prohibition of dis-
crimination as a traditional personality right. The ministerial reasoning of the 
1959/ IV. Act on the Civil Code makes it explicit that the primary aim of the 
prohibition of discrimination is to protect individuals in private relations. In 
2004, the Act on equal treatment amended this provision requiring equal 
treatment instead of non-discrimination of individuals.75  
 Some examples from the jurisprudence of ordinary courts show how they 
interpret this general personality right provision; how far they went in the so 
called constitutional interpretation. In 2002, the court charged a pub owner to 
pay for non-pecuniary damage of Roma applicants, who were not allowed to 
enter to the pub.76 Also, when Roma students of a school were organized separate 
farewell parties from non-Roma students, the court based its argumentation on 
Art. 76 of the Civil Code.77 A handicapped person, who could not get into a 
bank building also sued with success.78 
 The bounderies of the freedom to act in private relations are established in 
the Civil Code as well as in the Constitution, namely we may find obligatory 
general clauses in the civil law regulations as well. The main question thus 
refers to the content of these rules in private law, how they should comply with 
the Constitution if it comes to interpretation. Vékás argues in favour of the 
explicit codification of indirect horizontal effect, which would necessitate 
that the judges fill up the content of the general civil law provisions with 
  
 73 Lábady: Alkotmányjogi hatások...  op. cit.  
 74 Vékás: Az új Polgári Törvénykönyv... op. cit. 159. 
 75 2003. évi CXXV. törvény 37. §, in effect from 01. 27. 2004, see this in: Menyhárd 
A.: Diszkriminációtilalom és polgári jog. op. cit.  34. 
 76 EBH 2002,case 625. 
 77 EBH 2001,case 515. 
 78 BH 1995/12, 698. In accordance with similar cases and hypotheticals a recent study 
of Attila Menyhárd tries to prove that the limitation on private liberty will not produce 
general welfare. Menyhárd A.: Diszkriminációtilalom és polgái jog. op. cit.  8–15.  
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constitutional content.79 However, it is still not clear what exactly this “consti-
tutional content” means in case of the anti-discrimination provision. 
 At this point we might be able to refer to the implications of the solution of 
the anti-discrimination act. We can observe that the idea of indirect horizontality, 
where the Constitution radiates through the provisions of ordinary civil law, 
gives certainly less identified protection against non-discrimination in private 
relations, than the Act on equal treatment, with its “indirect direct” horizontal 
effect. Hence it is worth to consider that the Civil Code should regulate more 
extra-contractual relations in accordance with the Act on equal treatment in 
order to provide as wide protection as other vehicles of law on this field.  
 Also, it would be possible that the new civil code borrows the idea of the 
Act on equal treatment and introduces the “indirect direct” horizontal effect. 
The practical side of this suggestion, as we saw above, that the legislative, 
the codificators can determine the scope where the constitutional rules may 
intrude, but the way of constitutional adjudication can facilitates the right 
balance between the person’s liberty and equality in each and every case.  
 Above, we considered the principal difference between the three solutions 
and now we try to reconcile those. Namely acknowledge that accepting the 
direct effect would leave it with the judiciary to decide where the Constitution 
applies and what that provokes in private matters, even outside the sphere of 
present judicial intrusion. Contrary to this, in case of the indirect doctrine, the 
Constitution is not capable to intrude into the private sphere unless the 
ordinary law, preferably a general clause lives open the door for it.  
 The highlighted idea brings a new and important trend into this debate 
because offers a medium way hopefully a golden medium. The solution of the 
Act on equal treatment offers dogmatically a clear compromise between the 
three concepts of horizontal applicability of the non-discrimination clause of 
the Constitution. If the legislative wishes to extend the scope of the protection 
against arbitrary discrimination in private relations, the implementation of new 
provisions–declaring the “indirect-direct horizontal effect”–become necessary 
in order to reach demonstratively the desired level of protection. This solution 
preserves the idea of value monism, at the same time gives opportunity to the 
legislation to differenciate between private relations of different nature. 
 
  
 79 Vékás L.: Az új Polgári Törvénykönyv... op. cit. 149, also in Vékás, L.: A szerződési 
szabadság alkotmányos korlátai [The constitutional limits of freedom of contract]. Jog-
tudományi Közlöny 47 (1992) 56–59 and Vékás, L.: Egyenlő bánásmód polgári jogi jog-
viszonyokban? [Equal treatment in private law relationships?] Jogtudományi Közlöny, 
61 (2006) 355. 
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2.3. Towards a solution 
 
Finally it would be important to give guidelines to the legislative concerning 
what to bear in mind when determining the scope of the constitutional 
protection in private law, when reconsiliating guiding constitutional rights. 
 There is no general right to liberty as such. The argument in case of a 
particular liberty is an independent argument from any other concerning other 
liberties.80 The meaning of anti-discrimination can also be different in relation to 
property rights as in the context of school or voting.81 Contrary to the Anglo-
Saxon system of constitutional rights, the justification of liberty and equality 
both root in the concept of equal human dignity in the Hungarian juris-
prudence. The state recognizes everybody’s right to equal human dignity; 
this is the basic rule of the Hungarian constitutional system. Furthermore 
individuals have the right against the legislature that it protects them against 
other citizens.82  
 As both liberty and equality are grounded in the concept of dignity, and 
every case differs from the other, the legislative cannot set up more precise 
norms under the presently ruling constitutional theory than we have seen in the 
jurisprudence of the Hungarian Constitutional Courts or we found in the text of 
the Act on equal treatment. Balancing83 must be the keyword.84, 85  
 We must also consider that one of the principal problems of solving this 
battle between the right to liberty and equality lies in the fact that there is two 
equally valid interpretation of equality: “equality–non-discrimination (in the 
public sphere) and equality–equality in autonomy (in the private sphere)”. 
  
 80 Dworkin R.: Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, Mass. 2001. 
 81 Tushnet  M.: The relationship between judicial review of legislation and the inter-
pretation of non-constitutional law… op. cit.  180. 
 82 See the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court above, and Alexy, R.: A theory of 
constitutional rights. Oxford, 2002. 324, 352. 
 83 However, the “reluctance also may be apparent even when constitutional balancing 
is applied to private law adjudication which may itself sometimes require the balancing of 
countervailing private rights. To judges brought up in the tradition of the private law, the 
weighing of countervailing private rights may seem to involve balancing of a mor e limited 
and familiar kind than the weighing of more capacious public interests required in consti-
tutional balancing.” Quint, P. E.: Free speech and private law in German Constitutional 
Theory. Maryland Law Review, 48 (1988) 247, 290. 
 84 Alexy: A theory of constitutional rights... op. cit.  82 
 85 See a contrary opinion from the anglo-saxon heritage in Dworkin: op. cit. 184. He 
describes why constitutional rights should not apply to private relations. According to 
Dworkin the essence of constitutional rights is to give standards to policy consideration, to 
determine the limits of policy actions, hence they cannot be balances against each other per se. 
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Through anti-discrimination laws the legislative introduced equality in the 
meaning of public law, which has naturally changed the situation, because 
substituted the choice of the individual with the standards of the community.86 
  The words of the constitutions refer to the duties of the state to do or to 
refrain from doing something. This would suggest that private actors can behave 
differently from state actors because the constitution names rules concerning 
public relations.87 This paradigm is in alteration now, which makes confusion, 
and raises the question of value monism. But it is reasonable to accept the 
changing role of the constitutions, and it will help to understand the new 
phenomenons. 
 Even if we reject value pluralism, and accept value monism we can easily 
differenciate between public and private and within private relations as well 
with the help of the balancing system. Aharon Barak makes two clear case 
studies in order to illustrate the solution: The restaurant owner certainly have 
the right to choose who to contract with, but can not discriminate on the basis of 
race, gender or religion, meanwhile an owner, who wishes to rent out one room 
of his flat should have the right to pick whoever he likes. But what is the 
difference between the two cases? The “proper balance” between the right to get 
a service without discrimination and the right to freedom of contract will give a 
solution for the problem; namely, in the former case the right to get the service 
without discrimination prevails over the right of the owner to choose his guests. 
Meanwhile in the second case the right to choose freely a person to rent a room 
in my flat prevails over the others right not to be discriminated arbitrarily.  
 Barak continues that the root of this balance lies in the concept that the 
freedom of contract is stronger in relation to a person’s privacy, meanwhile 
it is weaker when directed against the public at large. Per analogiam–he 
demonstrates–the right not to be discriminated is weaker when offered to a 
general public. In this case, the discriminated person is segregated from the 
public on the basis of race, gender, religion etc. However, the right not to be 
discriminated becomes weaker when the service, in its nature is not open to the 
public but provided on a personal basis.88 
 In order to understand the idea of the right balance, the assessment of 
bargaining power relations could also help if taken into account. If one party 
has power over the other one, if one of the parties is defenseless the sheer 
  
 86 Sommeregger, G.: The Horizontalization of Equality. In: Sajó–Uitz (eds.): op. cit. 
 87 Garvey, J. H.–Aleinikoff, A. T.: Modern Constitutional Theory: A Reader. St. Paul, 
Minn. Third Edition, 1994. 695. 
 88 Barak, A.: Constitutional Human rights and Private law. In: Friedman, D.–Barak-
Erez, D.: Human Rights In Private Law. Oxford, 2001. 39. 
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sense tells that the state has to protect the weak one in order to provide the 
same liberties to everyone because the stronger party is capable to take away 
the other’s constitutional rights.89 
It is easy to understand that direct horizontal effect denies the public-private 
divide,90 although this divide exists, because the results of the balancing will 
be definitely different on the different fields of laws. The anti-discrimination 
laws seemingly uphold the public-private divide; just shift the borders of it, 
meanwhile upholding the theory of value-monism. 
 Private law has always prohibited certain kinds of discrimination on certain 
grounds, but this issue at stake calls for a different approach. The legislation 
has developed the idea that fundamental rights indeed apply in private relations, 
and thus the legislative and the judiciary will apply the scrutiny developed by 
the national constitutional court. The standards became the same on both fields 
of private and public law, however we should not forget about the balancing of 
constitutional rights, which will provide different end results in cases of fields 
closer to the public law, than on fields closer to private matters.  
 We find a gradual system, where between the two ends, controversial cases 
with public law and private law elements emerge. The legislative must determine 
this scope of the potencially controversial cases and in those cases guarantee 
judicial assessment under constitutional standards (“indirect-direct horizontal 
  
 89 This idea is present in many fields of legislation, such as consumer protection, 
employment matters, or certain rules of the Civil Code. For example, if there is one store in 
the village and the salesman does not want to serve somebody on the basis of his skin 
color, or handicap, we feel that the state should intervene and protect the individual. 
However, if there are several shops in the village and they have the same offer for the same 
price, and one of the owners does not want to serve a person with colored skin, the 
situation is slightly different. Here the situation is more horizontal in reality, because the 
discriminated person can go to the other shops and the discriminative owner is in a worse 
financial position as a result, because he looses a guest. However this reasoning leads us 
back finally to the “separate but equal” interpretation of equality, which was declared bad 
law a long-long time ago. (The idea of separate, but equal came from the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision, Plessy v. Fergusson (1986, 163 U.S. 537) and was overruled in 1954 by 
Brown v. Board of education (347 U.S. 483). In the former decision the court concluded 
that it is constitutional that states could prohibit the use of certain train carriges by blacks, 
if they were provided with other carrigies.) This example calls our attention to the perils of 
this interpretation and affirms the view that the discrimination, which violates the human 
dignity of a person is not much different is horizontal and vertical private relations. 
 90 See about these fears more, in Pfeiffer, Th.: Diskriminierung oder Nichtdiskriminierung–
Was ist hier eigentlich die Frage? Zeitschrift für das gesamte Schuldrecht, (2002) 165; 
Pickler, E.: Antidiskriminierungsgesetz – Der Anfang vom Ende der Privatautonomie? 
Juristenzeitung, 57 (2002) 880. 
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effect”). In other cases following a constitutional balancing process within 
its own competence, the legislative can decide on excluding the possibility 
of the juducial direct application of constitutional norms in order to secure a 
calculable rights protection respecting the idea of separation of powers. This 
legislative decision, the Civil code e.g. can be subjected to rewiew by the 
Constitutional Court. This modern constitutional idea definitely changes the 





This contribution aimed to analyze the conception of the “horizontal effect of 
the Constitution”, namely how the Constitution applies in private relations 
through judicial activity and what the positions of the legislative and the 
constitutional court of Hungary are. I argued that the question as to whether 
constitutional rights apply in private litigations does not exclusively depend on 
the acknowledgement of direct or indirect horizontal effect. I suggested that it 
was better to leave the decision on this problem with the legislation and as to 
the measure already set up the review of the right balance will stay at constitu-
tional courts as the final instance of constitutionality. In Hungary, where the 
constitutional court does not have the competence to review the decisions of 
ordinary courts, it is quite dangerous to require from the judiciary to apply 
constitutional norms in their vaguely abstract form. However, I demonstrated 
that the judiciary has to interpret legal provisions in the light of the 
constitution even if the doctrine of indirect horizontal effect is not explicitely 
introduced into the constitutional system. 
 A separation of power point of view supports my position. The constitution’s 
original purpose was to regulate the relation of the state and the individual. If 
there is intent to extend the scope of the constitution to certain private relations, 
it should be as well left with the legislative to determine, how far the consti-
tution should apply in private relations. The necessity, proportionality test and 
the “objective reason” justification, that the constitutional court established as a 
standard to justify discrimination in certain cases applies thorugh anti-discrimi-
nation laws presently as well in the described situations. The legislative in fact 
orders that judges decide on possible violations under these standards in the 
scope of cases the legislative previously determined in the Act. This is the 
“indirect-direct” horizontal application.  
 This idea could be useful when finding answers to the questions emerging 
in connection with the codification of the new Civil Code. Following the consti-
tutional requirements of interpretation set up by the Constitutional Court, the 
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legislative has to take into account the constitutional right to equality and 
private autonomy, liberty (which is on the other side of the balance) when 
assessing the problem of discrimination. Hence it is fully possible to develop a 
different understanding of the principle of non-discrimination in public and 
private relations, what is more, it is hardly possible to say that it is exactly the 
same in these two relationships. Thereafter the legislative will determine the 
scope where the judiciary must be entitled to assess the individual cases, the 
acts of single private actors under pure constitutional standards. 
 
 
* * * 
 
 
This paper tried to offer a response as to whether the private law principles or 
common constitutional principles serve as a framework for the examination of 
the above issues. I argue that the present tendencies demand the “constitu-
tional” answer: the fight for the enforcement of equal human dignity must be 
reconciled with economic and social rationality. This is forced by the inherent 
development of law, the changing role of the constitutions. However, as far 
as it is possible the legislative should decide on the just and prescise balance 
between liberty and equality concerns and thus the traditional idea of 
“horizontal application of the Constitution” might loose voice.   
 
